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Good Government and 

Politics as Usual? 

The Schizophrenic Path 
of the Workers' Party 
WHEN LUIZ INACIO "Lula" da Silva won Brazil's presidency in he and his 
Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores; PT) had most observers convinced 
that this was a watershed moment for the country's democracy. The victory 
of this former shoeshine boy, metalworker, and union leader symbolized to 
many the arrival to power of Brazil's excluded masses and the opportunity 
to put into practice the modo petista de govemar (the PT way of governing), 
lauded as participatory, redistributive, and above all, transparent. Fourteen 
years of PT government and several astounding corruption scandals later, few 
illusions remain. The PT was gravely wounded by the scandals, starting with 
the so-called mensalao (monthly bribe scandal) in 2005. This scandal brought 
resignations and later jail sentences for the party's top leaders and members 
of Lula's cabinet as well as renewed calls for reforming Brazil's political insti-
tutions as multiple parties were caught taking bribes. Despite punishment for 
the mensalao's perpetrators, the PT's own efforts to strengthen participatory 
and transparency institutions, and the promises to clean house by Lula's suc-
cessor, Dilma Rousseff, even larger corruption scandals followed, imperiling 
the PT's hold on the presidency and threatening its future. 
From its inception in the early 198os, the PT had stood for incorruptibility, 
refusing to accept the military's offer of indirect presidential elections during 
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democratization, leading the charge for investigating corruption under Pres-
ident Collor, and emphasizing clean government at the municipal level , 
where the party was increasingly successful. Scholars of the country's noto-
riously weak party system regularly noted the PT's outlier status as virtually 
the only ideologically driven, internally democratic, and disciplined party. 
Lula's 2002 presidential campaign stressed the party's ethics and anti-corrup-
tion message. Its first commercial showed rats chewing on a Brazilian flag 
and the caption: "Either we finish them off or they finish off Brazil. Ciao, 
corruption-a campaign by the PT and the Brazilian people" (Markun 2004, 
313-14). Just a few years later, when an aide to the PT president's brother 
was caught in Brasflia's airport with a hundred thousand US dollars in his 
underwear, Lula's finance minister and chief of staff resigned, as did the PT's 
president, secretary-general, and treasurer, all tied to the mensalao scandal.' 
How did the PT move from a party that built its "party brand" on honesty and 
transparency to a party in which high-ranking officials were engaged in sys-
tematic forms of corruption? Further, why did the PT not switch course after 
the mensalao and limit the involvement of high-ranking officials in illegal 
political behavior? 
Presidents Lula and Dilma tried to minimize the scandals in the press, 
saying that the PT had only done what other parties do, but this is precisely 
the point, as Gois argues: "In the end-and this is the mother of all issues-
many people voted for the PT because the party did not do what the others 
do" (2005, 14). Why would the party put its hard-fought, vote-getting repu-
tation for good government at risk? There are two disparate interpretations 
of the PT. On one hand, some observers highlight the modo petista de go-
vernar, which made the PT famous worldwide as an innovative party for the 
downtrodden that promoted the use of new democratic institutions, inclusive 
social policies, and more transparent implementation processes. The second 
interpretation, one its conservative opponents have long asserted, is that the 
P'T's supposed ethical patrimony has simply been a farce all along; PT politi-
cians used their access to state power (by winning elections) to divert public 
resources toward advancing the party's interests as well as their own. 
The schizophrenic nature of the PT once in office is best exemplified by 
its strengthening of the state's oversight capabilities, building on its trajectory 
as a party of "good government," while simultaneously engaging in bribery 
and money laundering. Indeed, it is baffling that many high-ranking PT offi-
cials continued such illegal activities at the same time as the PT-led govern-
ment invested in transparency and participatory institutions that improved 
monitoring of public resource allocation. The need for campaign resources to 
gain and maintain office held greater sway over PT officials than the fear that 
the newly strengthened transparency institutions would be applied to them. 
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Further, the initial use of illegal fund-raising activities by some high-ranking 
PT officials gave their political rivals power over them in three ways, making 
it difficult for the party to reverse course once its officials began to use cor-
rupt practices. First, since ideologically distant parties were included in the 
governing coalition partly through kickback schemes, those politicians could 
threaten to reveal damaging information if the money did not continue to 
flow. Second, the prosecution of the PT's top officials following the men-
salao scandal, including past party presidents Jose Dirceu and Jose Genoino, 
discredited the PT's ability to campaign on the claim that it would fight cor-
ruption. Third, political rivals working inside the state (such as prosecutors, 
judges, and police linked to opposition parties) were able to investigate and 
expose PT officials' involvement in wrongdoing. 
Four interweaving strands of explanation help illuminate the PT's schizo-
phrenic nature. These involve the rising cost of Brazilian elections, the 
strategic decisions of the party's dominant faction, the Campo Majoritario 
(Majority Camp), basic governing challenges faced by the PT, and finally, the 
establishment of new institutions that were designed to appeal to activists who 
sought to create new channels for participation and transparency. 
The Rise of the PT 
The activists who founded the PT in 1979 shared commitments to ending 
Brazil's military dictatorship, establishing democracy, and implementing 
some form of socialism. Unions, social movements, intellectuals, and pro-
gressive sectors of the middle class formed the base of the new party, which 
emphasized internal democracy regarding policy decisions, political orienta-
tion, and leadership selection (Keck 1992). From its early moments in local 
government, the party established a PT way of governing that also served as 
a party branding strategy (Goldfrank 2004; Nylen 2ooo). Although the PT 
gave minority factions the opportunity to influence their fellow party mem-
bers, by the mid-199os a dominant faction- known at the time as the Campo 
Majoritario-emerged under Lula, Jose Dirceu, and their allies in the state 
of Sao Paulo such as Celso Daniel and Jose Genoino. Internal democratic 
procedures encouraged minority factions to remain in the party because of 
a shared understanding that the PT represented a new way of conducting 
politics that would eventually change Brazil. While never explicitly defining 
the socialism it sought, the party maintained strong ideological commitments 
to the "inversion of priorities," which meant reorienting Brazil away from its 
historically unequal and exclusionary political and economic practices. 
To transform Brazil, the PT long advocated a two-track strategy. The party 
emphasized both electoral politics and social struggle, conceived as build-
ing a grassroots movement capable of engaging in direct political action to 
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advance PT causes. Over time Lula and the Campo MajoritDrio increas-
ingly favored a focus on winning elections for executive positions over social 
movement-style activism (Freire de Lacerda 2002). Indeed, the PT's electoral 
fortunes improved steadily and dramatically at all levels of government from 
its first efforts in 1982 until recent elections, when popular support decreased 
(see table 2.1). 
As the PT won office, its mayors and governors emphasized participatory 
decision-making as a means to invert priorities, appeal to social movement 
allies, demonstrate its commitment to honesty, and thereby build support by 
distinguishing itself from Brazil's myriad other parties. An exemplary case is 
that of Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, which rests on the principles 
of deliberation, transparency, social justice, and direct citizen involvement 
in selecting policy outcomes (Abers 2ooo; Baiocchi 2005; Goldfrank 2007; 
Wampler and Avritzer 2004). More than two hundred PT mayors and even a 
few governors adopted Participatory Budgeting. The PT also succeeded in the 
1990s at developing other innovative policies, such as Bolsa Escola, which-
from its inception in Brasilia-provided targeted funds to low-income families 
to reward and ensure regular school attendance. While PT federal deputies 
and senators, as members of the political opposition, continually demanded 
investigations into corruption by the ruling parties at the national level, sub-
national PT administrations illustrated that the party was capable ofgoverning 
creatively and responsibly. By the time of the watershed 2002 election, public 
opinion polls suggested that Brazilians considered the PT the most honest 
political party by a wide margin, which was one factor among many in Lula's 
favor in his fourth run at the presidency (Goldfrank 2004, 207-8; Fundacao 
Perseu Abramo  
Campaign Finance, Official and Otherwise 
To win the presidency, Lula needed money. Our starting point for examining 
the PT's unexpected descent into "politics as usual" is to note that running 
for election in Brazil was expensive in the 1990s, at least as expensive as in the 
United States (Samuels 2001, 33). An avowedly socialist party like the PT in 
an unequal capitalist country like Brazil could only raise comparatively small 
amounts of money. Given a law prohibiting union donations, the PT relied 
on the public funding available to all parties as well as on mandatory contri-
butions by party members. For other parties, private corporations, especially 
in finance and construction, provided the most funds. This helps explain why 
PT candidates for federal deputy received eleven times less money on average 
than non-left candidates in 1994, and six times less in 1998 (our calculations 
from Samuels 2001, 39). 
In the 1989, 1994, and 1998 presidential campaigns, the winning candi-
Table 2.1. PT Election Results, 1982-2014 
Election Year 1982 1986 1990 1998 2002 2006 1994 2010 2014 
Governors    2 3 3 4 6 5 
Federal Deputies 8 16 35 49 s8 91 83 88 68 
RI&KDPEHU 2 10 11 18 16 3 7 17 13 
Election Year 1982 1985 1988 1992 1996 
Mayors 1 2 38  54 187 411 
Mayors in 
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dates vastly outspent Lula. In 1994 when campaign contributions were first 
made public, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's donors gave his campaign more 
than twenty times as much as Lula, and the donation gap for the 1998 race was 
nearly the same (see table 2.2). Cardoso won easily in the first round of both 
elections. However, the  campaign marked a major turning point, with 
Lula out-fund-raising all the other candidates, including Cardoso's intended 
successor, Jose Serra. In every election since  the PT's presidential cam-
paigns have raised more money than their opponents. 
This official reversal of fortunes is interesting, of course. Yet more intrigu-
ing were the unofficial estimates of 5million in off-the-books donations 
(Attuch 2oo6, 16). Why did Lula's campaign coffers- official and otherwise-
suddenly swell? The explanation lies in two converging trends at the turn of 
the century. On one hand, the PT had tried but failed to reform campaign 
finance laws banning union donations and desperately needed funding for 
the  national elections, which the PT had a good chance of winning 
given the Cardoso government's unpopularity. On the other hand, the private 
firms that had previously spent money on keeping the PT out of office were 
watching the party's steady electoral growth and the public opinion polls and 
decided to finance not only Serra but also Lula as an insurance policy (Fausto 
2005, 211; Attuch 2oo6). Attuch notes that the financiers gave equally to Serra's 
campaign and generally preferred to donate off the record (2oo6, 28-29). 
Crucially, off-the-books contributions to Lula's 2002 campaign presaged 
the larger scandal, the illegal cash payments-or mensalao-to congressional 
allies during Lula's presidency. Like most parties, the PT spent more on cam-
paigning than it raised and owed more than R$55 million for the presidential 
and governors' races combined (Attuch 2oo6, 37). In 2003 the PT's treasurer 
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Table 3.2. Presidential Campaign Donations and PT First Round Vote Share, 
1994-2014 
Election Year 1994 1998 2002 2006  2014 
PT Candidate Lula, Lula, /XOD Lula, Dilma, Dilma, 
(in millions RIFXUUHQWreais) 3.1  26.6 81.2   
PSDB Candidate Cardoso, Cardoso, Serra, Alckmin, Serra, Neves, 
(in millions of current rea is)  66.3 18.2   226.9 
Vote for PT Candidate (%) 27 32 46 49 47 42 
Note: &RPLWHFinanceiro Nacional para Presidente da Rep(Iblica PSDB- BR. 
Sources: For 1994-2002 (Samuels 2oo6); for 2oo6-2014 (www.tse.jus.br). 
began engaging in unusual financial transactions with a marketing executive 
whose firms secured loans to cover the campaign expenses of the PT, and 
soon thereafter, its allies. Drastically simplifying the story, the money trail 
operated like this: publicity firms took out loans for or with the PT; the PT 
used these to pay its 2002 national campaign debts and its 2004 municipal 
campaign expenses and to provide campaign funds to members of parties al-
lied with the PT in Congress; and the publicity firms received contracts from 
federal government agencies, the funds of which they are assumed to have 
used in part to pay off the loans (see Flynn 2005, 1236-38). 
Remarkably, despite the uproar regarding the PHQVDODRwhich included 
calls for Lula's impeachment, not only did subsequent national election cam-
paigns follow the pattern of the 2002 race, with ever greater funds donated to 
the PT candidates (see Table 2.2), but corruption schemes similar to the men-
salao continued as well. The largest of these is the so-called petrolao, in which 
Petrobras senior directors are alleged to have taken bribes to inflate costs for 
contractors (empreiteiras), who channeled parcels of those funds to lobbyists 
and money launderers, who in turn dispersed funds to politicians within the 
PT and its coalitional partners to cover campaign costs, among other things; 
to close the loop, those politicians appointed the Petrobras executives. It is 
worth pointing out that many of the contractors involved in the petrolao-
such as Odebrecht, OAS, Camargo Correa, and Andrade Gutierrez-ranked 
among the top donors to the presidential campaigns of Lula and Dilma, and 
that, following the pattern from 2002, the same firms donated large amounts 
to the PT's rivals as well. The petrolao scheme helped all involved except for 
Petrobras itself, which in 2015, after the Lava Jato investigation uncovered the 
fraud, announced billions of dollars in losses to graft, saw its market value 
plummet, and faced class-action lawsuits from foreign investors. 
In sum, from its mostly self-reliant and comparatively penniless position 
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in the 198os and 1990s, the PT's finances changed dramatically in the zooos. 
In elections for all levels of government, the PT, like other parties, received 
large corporate donations, spent extravagantly on campaigns, and contracted 
debts, furthering the need for more funds. Yet campaign costs are not the 
whole story. To understand whether the PT had always engaged in corruption 
schemes and why it continued to do so even after the mensalao scandal broke, 
it is important to consider the role of internal party dynamics and factional 
politics. 
Moderating (and Corrupting?) the PT 
The party faction under Lula and Dirceu, which has led the PT for most of 
its existence, played a key part in transforming the party into one that could 
attract campaign contributions and win national elections. This faction, or 
coalition of factions, first called Articulacao and later expanded to become 
the Campo Majoritario, has won all but one of the party's internal elections at 
the national level since 1984. Lula, party president during the 198os and early 
1990s, occupied a center-right position within the party from 1989 onward and 
consistently aligned himself with the right to ensure control. The left wing 
won the party's presidency only in 1993, leaving it in control of the disastrous 
1994 general election, a humiliating loss for Lula. The alleged incompetence 
of the PT's left wing and Lula's vow to never again run for president without 
direct control over his campaign led to the 1995 internal party elections that 
dramatically reshaped the PT. 
For those elections, Dirceu united center and right factions of the party 
to create the Campo Majoritario; he became the PT's National President 
and held that position for the next seven years. Dirceu used his victory to 
consolidate power, creating a "party within a party" to ensure loyalty to him, 
as well as building alliances at the PT's local and state levels to ensure that 
Lula's group would continue to control the party (Flynn 2005, 1254). Under 
the direction of Dirceu and over the left's objections, the PT (1) moved far-
ther away from its grassroots social movement strategy, instead concentrating 
its energy and resources on winning elections for mayors, governors, and the 
presidency; (z) moderated its national campaign platforms; and (3) began en-
tering into electoral coalitions with parties that previously had been vetoed as 
too corrupt, personalist, centrist, or clientelist by the PT left. 
By zooz Lula's campaign made the PT's transformation clear. Party mili-
tants waving flags at massive rallies and get-out-the-vote efforts were replaced 
by slick television spots and concerts. Lula did not mention revolution or 
socialism but, rather, respect for international contracts and IMF agreements. 
The campaign slogan was "Lulinha-paz e amor" (Little Lula-peace and 
love). As running mate, Lula selected the owner of one of Brazil's largest tex-
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tile manufacturers, Jose Alencar, who brought his center-right Liberal Party 
(Partido Liberal; PL) into the PT-led coalition fronted by Lula. 
While some see the PT's growing moderation and the ever-increasing 
dominance of the Campo Majoritario as results of internal party democracy 
(Samuels 2004) or successful party adaptation (Hunter 2010), other observers 
and PT insiders, especially on the left, claim that the Campo Majoritario's 
external and thus internal victories were aided by the same kinds of slush 
funds that apparently helped Lula's 2002 campaign (Flynn 2005; Moraes 
2005; Wainwright and Branford 2oo6). In other words, they claim that the 
scandals that rocked Lula's administration were similar to the arrangements 
that had been used by the Campo Majoritario to consolidate its control of 
the PT. The more successful a faction's candidates were in winning execu-
tive offices (governors and mayors), and to a lesser extent, legislative offices, 
the more paid government positions the faction could offer its members and 
potential recruits from other factions, and in turn, the better it could perform 
in internal elections. This does not imply that the PT's emphasis on honesty 
and transparency was a "farce" but, rather, that the political group in control 
of the PT, the Campo Majoritario, was willing to use strategies previously 
rejected by the PT to consolidate its control. 
As Moraes explains, Campo Majoritario leaders created a "parallel finance 
network" that "operated as an instrument of discrimination and internal privi-
leges without the knowledge of the collective decision-making bodies," direct-
ing both official and unofficial resources to party moderates (2005, 196-97). 
This explanation echoes the complaints by critical PT leaders on the left. 
They claim that "the Campo Majoritario built its own political machine 
within the party to advance its aim of achieving more flexible policies" and 
that "some sectors of the party started to have incredibly well-funded cam-
paigns" (Wainwright and Branford 2006, 21-22, also 23, 25-26, 33). Thus, Dir-
ceu consolidated Campo Majoritario control to pull the party to the center, 
apparently utilizing similarly underhanded tactics to those that later would be 
used to carve out congressional majorities to support PT presidential agendas. 
Evidence to support the critics' position includes the fact that the first 
corruption scandals linked to the PT emerged in municipalities governed by 
Campo Majoritario leaders. Many of Lula's 2002 campaign fund-raisers were 
already active in the PT's local administrations, especially in the state of Sao 
Paulo, where they engaged in the same sorts of financial practices for which 
they were later investigated (Attuch 2oo6; see also Folha de Sao Paulo 2005). 
Lower-level PT officials in municipalities appear to have been involved in 
financial transactions that gave them access to revenues from public and pri-
vate bus companies, garbage collection, and bingo halls, which were sources 
of the PT's caixa dais (off-the-books slush fund) as well as more ordinary 
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kickback schemes. Two key examples are the municipalities of Santo Andre 
and Ribeirao Preto. In Santo Andre the longtime mayor, Celso Daniel, was 
coordinating Lula's election campaign in 2002 when he was kidnapped and 
murdered, allegedly over a dispute regarding kickbacks from privatized bus 
lines (New York Times 2004). In Ribeirao Preto, a former advisor to then PT 
mayor, Antonio Palocci, was imprisoned temporarily in 2005 on charges of 
money laundering in transactions with bus companies and accused of over-
billing for garbage collection services (Folha de Sao Paulo 2005). He impli-
cated Palocci, who was ultimately forced to resign as Lula's finance minister 
in March 2oo6, because of these and related charges of operating a mensalao 
scheme as mayor (fomal do Brasil2oo6). And the very first corruption scandal 
during Lula's first term, "Waldomirogate," was associated with the Campo 
Majoritario. Dirceu's chief aide, Waldomiro Diniz, was caught on camera 
soliciting off-the-books campaign donations from a bingo hall owner. 
Notwithstanding the mensalao investigations and eventual indictments as 
well as subsequent lesser scandals, the Campo 0DMRULWDULRgroup, now called 
Construindo urn Novo Brasil, continued to win internal elections. Several 
historical PT leaders abandoned the party over ideological, policy, or ethical 
differences; some formed a new party, the Party ofSocialism and Liberty (Par-
tido Socialismo e Liberdade; PSOL), and some, like Marina Silva, joined 
other parties. Yet most left factions stayed within the party and began calling 
for its refounding. The left factions generally garnered around 45 percent of 
the vote for the PT's national presidency, which gave them hope that they 
would win in some not-too-distant future . And they continued to engage in 
internal party battles to obtain government positions and increase the size of 
their internal voting blocs. With the PT's continued electoral success at all 
levels, the number ofgovernment positions to fight over constantly increased. 
Furthermore, the PT governments were delivering on many social promises 
(see Section 4 of this essay), and Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, was linked 
to none of the party factions and had vowed "a zero tolerance policy for cor-
ruption in her cabinet" %DOiQ83). Dilma's independence from the fac-
tions gave her flexibility, but it also meant she had to pay careful attention to 
rewarding multiple groups to maintain their loyalty. 
Governing Challenges 
Lula and the PT ascended to the presidency in 2003 as a minority party in 
Congress with an ambitious policy agenda. Having met the challenges of a 
leftist party seeking campaign contributions and winning national power, the 
PT faced a set of four related governing challenges. It was the PT's response 
to these challenges that led high-ranking officials to be more closely involved 
in illegal practices; it was also the PT's continued efforts to build participatory 
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Table 2.Distribution of Cabinet Positions 
Cardoso 2 Lula2 Rousse{{1 Rousse{{2 
Cabinet positions 
Party of president 
Non-partisan 26% 
Sources: For Cardoso and Lula $PRULPNeto 2007 cited in 3HUHLUDet al. for 
Rousseff (personal communication with Amorim Neto and Clabo 2015). 
and transparency institutions that led these officials to be prosecuted by the 
state. 
The first challenge faced by Lula-and later Dilma-was that they had to 
grapple with the PT's strong ideological and regional cleavages. Intense divi-
sion within the PT meant that President Lula had to placate different internal 
factions to ensure party unity. Lula increased the size of the cabinet and also 
distributed far more seats to members of the PT than Cardoso had distributed 
to members of his party, the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (Partido da 
Social Democracia Brasileira; PSDB). Lula's strategy became the blueprint 
for his two terms and President Dilma's first term. Although the PT held only 
29 percent of the seats in the lower chamber during Lula's first term in office, 
they distributed 6o percent of the cabinet positions to PT officials (table 2.3). 
The PT's distribution of cabinet positions to different PT factions meant 
that there were fewer seats for coalition partners. This helps to explain why 
the PT was induced to use the "monthly" payments scheme to generate sup-
port among congressional officials. The PT was unable to placate both PT 
officials as well as coalition partners, and there was a clear preference in Lu-
la's two terms and Dilma's first term for the distribution of more positions to 
PT members. Only in her cabinet shake-up in 2015 did Dilma finally seek to 
reduce the number of ministers and PT prevalence. 
The second challenge was that the PT needed to build support among 
congressional officials. This meant that the PT would need to work with po-
litical parties that had previously been bitter rivals-and even with specific 
individuals, such as Paulo Maluf and Fernando &ROORUagainst whom the PT 
had once vigorously campaigned. When the PT first came to power in 2003, 
President Lula's challenge of building a stable voting coalition was some-
what greater than President Cardoso's challenge from 1995 to 2002 because 
there was a greater ideological and policy distance between the PT and other 
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members of its coalition (PL, PP, PTB, PMDB) than had existed between the 
centrist PSDB and its key supporters (PFL, PMDB).2 
To develop support within Congress, the PT followed the governing strat-
egy established by the PSDB under President Cardoso, using what is now 
known as "coalitional presidentialism" to generate a stable voting majority 
(Power ). "The core insight ofcoalitional presidential ism is that presidents 
must behave like European prime ministers. Executives must fashion multi-
party cabinets and voting blocs on the floor of the legislature" (Power 2010, 
26). President Lula's magnetic personality made him ideally situated to play 
a central role in fashioning complex and stable voting blocs. Power identifies 
a "presidential toolbox" with four tools that help presidents to secure a stable 
voting majority in Congress: continual adjustment of the "size, heterogeneity 
and proportionality of the support coalition in Congress ... , plus the use 
of pork (budgetary clientelism)" (Power 2010, 27). The "presidential toolbox" 
captures how the use of budget-based pork is a key institutional power at the 
disposal of the president. However, it has become increasingly apparent that 
the presidential toolbox concept needs to be expanded beyond budget-based 
pork to also include the allocation of well-positioned jobs that allow the job-
holders to take advantage of their appointed positions for political gain and/ 
or personal enrichment. A principal resource available to Brazilian presidents 
continues to be the allocation of strategically positioned "plum" jobs-from 
cabinet ministers to second- and third-tier management positions in the fed-
eral bureaucracy to executive positions in public companies such as Petro-
bras, BNDES, and Caixa Economica Federal; Wendy Hunter estimates that 
the Brazilian president is able to distribute twenty thousand jobs (2010, 164). 
The distribution of these jobs generates support for the incumbent presi-
dent in three ways. First, the job provides a steady income to the individual. 
Although these wages are often a small amount of the larger budget, the abil-
ity to distribute jobs was extremely consequential for the PT because party 
members holding these jobs are often required to give 10 percent of their 
salary to the PT; these funds have long helped to sustain the party. Second, 
public officials use their positions to ensure that a small percentage of public 
resources are allocated through private companies back to the party to gen-
erate campaign resources. The mensalao and petrolao scandals are based on 
this scheme in which 1-5 percent of public contracts appear to be funneled 
back to party officials. Third, individuals holding these jobs could, if they 
wished, enrich themselves personally through bidding practices, allocation of 
contracts to political allies, and the like. 
Initially, it appeared that many of the corruption scandals under the PT 
presidential administrations had more to do with redirecting public funds to 
politicians and political parties than with bribery for personal gain (Flynn 
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2005; Taylor this volume). The two largest corruption scandals under the 
PT's four presidential administrations, the mensalao and the petrolao (see 
Taylor this volume), were based on complicated money-laundering schemes 
in which public resources were captured by the PT, which then used those 
resources to build support in Congress or to strengthen its campaign efforts. 
The PT did not invent this kickback method of funding political campaigns, 
as there is ample evidence that President Cardoso (1995-2002) used a similar 
scheme (Flynn 2005, 1235). It is noteworthy that the PT's two earliest scan-
dals- in the municipalities of Santo Andrp and Riberao Preto, both in the 
state of Smo Paulo-concerned kickback schemes involving bus and trash 
collection companies contracted by PT administrations (Flynn 2005, 1241). 
In sum, the PT worked within the system of coalitional presidentialism to 
govern. This coalitional presidentialism involved budgetary clientelism, but 
it increasingly appears that it also included the use of well-positioned PT al-
lies to continue the use of complicated kickback schemes. The PT adopted 
these schemes from the Cardoso administration, but it also appears that these 
schemes became more complex, which made them more difficult to unravel. 
It is telling that the two Brazilian reformist parties founded in the aftermath 
of the dictatorship, the PT and the PSDB, both used kickback mechanisms to 
sustain congressional majorities. The larger point here is that the PT moved 
away from its commitment to all aspects of the modo petista de governar 
and instead adapted much of the PSDB's economic program and its govern-
ing strategies to ensure consistent support in the national legislature. Often 
overlooked in the literature, the stability of coalitional presidentialism was 
partially based on the misappropriation of public resources to benefit parties 
and politicians. 
The third challenge for the PT was to develop a positive working relation-
ship with domestic and international capital so as to ensure the continuation 
of Brazil's economic stability. The PT's roots are situated in Marxist ideol-
ogy, with an ill-defined commitment to socialism and social transformation. 
During the 1989 presidential campaign, Lula's political opponents tried to 
create fear that Lula was a Marxist revolutionary who sought to impose a 
Cuban-style communist regime on Brazil. In order to placate the financial 
markets during the 2002 presidential campaign, Lula committed to maintain-
ing the fiscal austerity policies implemented by President Cardoso. In June 
2002 Lula's campaign issued a statement promising that, if elected president, 
he would not employ capital controls, would not renegotiate the external 
debt, and would maintain the Cardoso government's financial commitments. 
This Letter to the Brazilian People (Carta ao Povo Brasileiro), derided as the 
Letter to Calm the Bankers (Carta para Acalmar Banqueiro) by its critics, 
seems not to have had a tremendous effect on foreign investors, though it 
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caused a stir in Brazil. Lula essentially had committed his new government to 
following the economic strategy that had been developed by his predecessor. 
Thus, governing at the national level in a globalized environment dominated 
by neo-liberal ideas and institutions (IMF, Davos) strongly induced the PT 
to forge a close working relationship with the country's largest construction 
companies, banks, and agro-business. 
The commodities boom and the rapid economic expansion during the 
zooos made it easier for the PT to maintain better relations with important 
economic groups. The commodities boom allowed commodities exporters 
to expand, and it also greatly increased the revenues collected by the federal 
government. These revenues were used to fund an expansive infrastructure 
program (PAC) as well as the return of the developmentalist state (Schneider 
2016). The economic boom thus helped the PT to maintain a stable voting 
bloc in Congress because there was tremendous growth in the federal budget 
as well as in the budget of nationally held companies, such as Petrobras. The 
Lava Jato investigation illuminated the close relationship between Brazil's 
largest construction companies and government officials. The PT was deeply 
implicated in a series of insider deals that involved large construction compa-
nies providing significant kickbacks to politicians of all leading parties. What 
is most noteworthy about these scandals is that the PT appeared to be no dif-
ferent from other parties; WKH PT thus traveled a long distance in twenty short 
years from a party brand of "honesty and transparency" to "politics as usual." 
The fourth challenge for the PT was implementing its ambitious policy 
agenda. Over the course of four presidential administrations, the PT dedi-
cated resources to implementing new social policies rather than addressing 
the institutional problems that made governing Brazil so difficult. For exam-
ple, the trademark successes of the PT's government include the significant 
reduction of extreme poverty (mainly through Bolsa Familia and wage in-
creases), the expansion of the universal health care system (SUS) into previ-
ously underserviced communities (through initiatives like the Family Health 
Program and Mais Medicos), paying off the debt to the IMF to extract it-
self from foreign tutelage, expanding the federal university system (with new 
universities and increased enrollments), and the expansion of public partic-
ipation mechanisms (see next section). However, when we consider signifi-
cant institutional problems, such as the large number of political parties, the 
over-representation of rural states and regions, and the extensive corruption 
affecting all levels of government, it becomes clear that the PT did not focus 
on systemic political reforms. 
Instead, Presidents Lula and Dilma worked within and through the ex-
isting system to secure support for-or at least acquiescence to-their social 
agenda. Without engaging in extensive counter-factual scenarios, given the 
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historic animosity between the two parties that hypothetically might have 
aligned to pursue systemic political reforms, the PT and the PSDB, it seems 
highly unlikely that if Lula and Dilma had pushed for such reforms they 
would have succeeded. Furthermore, their social agenda would likely have 
been in jeopardy had they not added sweeteners to their coalition partners. 
In sum, the PT's position as a minority party, without strong ideological 
allies in Congress, led top party officials to use a combination of budgetary 
pork distribution to secure the votes of non-PT congressional allies and the 
illegal reallocation of public resources to the PT and its allies to build support 
within Congress as well as for campaign purposes. The nearly decade-long 
economic boom generated abundant revenues that greased the wheels of this 
system, enabling Presidents Lula and Dilma to maintain consistent support 
within Congress. The weakening of the economy since 2013, in conjunction 
with the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the state to police cor-
ruption, dovetails with the declining support for Dilma's government. At the 
broader level, the dependency of the PT on this governing strategy precluded 
the ability of the PT to engage in broader political reforms but allowed for 
innovative social and even judicial reforms. Now we turn to how the PT's in-
novations help account for its continued ability to win presidential elections 
despite growing evidence of an abandonment of its core ethical principles. In 
terms of basic social dynamics, the PT changed Brazil. 
Participation and Transparency 
Given the mensalao corruption scandal prior to the 2oo6 election, as well as 
the beginning of the Lava Jato investigation into the petrolao scandal prior 
to the 2014 election, both of which suggest that the PT moved away from its 
commitment to clean government, how could the PT continue to draw sup-
port from progressive social movements? How can we account for the political 
base's apparent willingness to overlook the PT's transgressions? We argue that 
the PT's strong support for the expansion of social and political rights-along-
side Brazil's generally positive economic performance for roughly a decade-
can explain the PT's continued support. We focus here on the expansion of 
political rights during the 2ooos. 
The PT purposefully redesigned participation and transparency mecha-
nisms, which created multiple opportunities for citizens to be engaged in the 
policymaking process while also strengthening oversight. Although the PT 
under President Lula abandoned its pledge to scale-up Participatory Budget-
ing, Presidents Lula and Dilma invested heavily in the building of a federal 
participation architecture, which allowed the social movement and civil so-
ciety base of the party to be actively involved in building policy while also at-
tracting additional supporters (Avritzer and Souza 2013). The PT thus eagerly 
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sought to incorporate citizens and social movement activists into the broader 
participatory architecture. There were three institutional venues favored by 
the federal government: public policy management councils, policy confer-
ences, and in a shift, "national level forums." While some scholars criticize 
the PT's national-level participatory institutions for lacking strategic impor-
tance and scope (see Gymez 2015), these venues provided policy and political 
resources for the government. 
First, the policy councils are part of a federally integrated policymaking 
system that is organized around specific policy issues (such as health, environ-
ment, and education). 'l ypically, councils are comprised of 50 percent civil 
society and 50 percent government members. Council members generally 
must approve the proposed budget for the policy area as well as approve a 
year-end report. Civil society representatives from municipal-level councils 
are then elected to a state-level council; from the state-level councils, civil 
society representatives are selected to serve on federal councils. This partici-
patory architecture thus linked the federal government to civil society activ-
ists across the country. This provided a means for ongoing communication, 
which had a policy focus as well as a political focus. By 2015 there were over 
sixty thousand municipal-level councils, hundreds of state-level councils, and 
dozens of federal councils. The participation of over three hundred thousand 
civil society representatives in these councils allowed the federal government 
to connect to social movement and civil society activists. There is a growing 
body of evidence that the use of participatory institutions is strongly associated 
with improvements in human development (Touchton and Wampler 2014; 
Gonoalves 2014; Touchton, Sugiyama, and Wampler 2017). The use of par-
ticipatory institutions is another extension of the accountability institutions 
implemented in Brazil since 1988; these councils allow for the exchange of 
information among citizens, community activists, and government officials, 
as well as for the additional monitoring of government actions. 
The PT also invested heavily in public policy conferences. There is a long 
history of conferences being used in Brazil, but the PT elevated their use to 
a level not previously seen. Between 2003 and 2015, the federal government 
hosted nearly one hundred conferences, including many in new policy are-
nas such as public securily, transparency, and communications (Avritzcr and 
Souza 2013; Pogrebinschi and Samuels 2014). There were an estimated 9 mil-
lion participants (it is impossible to know how many of the participants were 
counted more than once). The conferences were a great communication and 
mobilization resource for the federal government, as it was able to bypass the 
traditional media and directly connect with citizens and civil society activ-
ists. This enabled the PT to develop regular forms of communication with 
its base. In addition, Pogrebinschi and Samuels (2014) demonstrate that the 
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conferences were positively associated with executive decrees issued by the 
president. Although we cannot definitely state that the government would 
not have adopted the decrees in the absence of the conferences, Pogrebinschi 
and Samuels's (2014) evidence suggests that the conferences were successfully 
used by the government to link citizen participation to government action. 
These actions thus helped to create a political space for civil society activists 
within the PT's governing agenda. The conferences are the best example of 
the PT seeking to reach out to civil society activists to generate direct engage-
ment; the conference system connects citizens to government officials in an 
ongoing exchange. This, we believe, helps account for the PT's apparent abil-
ity to maintain ties to civil society even as it became a bureaucratized party. 
Finally, the PT began experimenting with national-level policy forums 
that would better connect national-level policymakers to professional NGOs 
and experts who could contribute to ongoing policy debates. These forums 
represent the transformation of the PT from a neighborhood- and union-
shop-level party to a party that inhabited a powerful executive branch. One 
forum, initiated by President Lula, was the Council on Economic and So-
cial Development. The purpose of the Council was to bring together diverse 
economic and social leaders to debate Brazil's trajectory, yet it gained little 
traction and never became a strong entity that directly influenced presiden-
tial decision-making (Coldfrank Similarly, under President Dilma, the 
government created a national forum that was charged with deliberating over 
the federal government's four-year plan (2012-2015, 2016-2019). Such forums 
brought together policy experts representing civil society, unions, and private 
corporations in an effort to solicit inputs, and they represent an effort by the 
PT to incorporate a diverse body of experts into public deliberations. They 
symbolize the transition of the PT from a grassroots party that sought to be 
heard at the municipal level into a party that governed a country of 200 mil-
lion residents. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that these councils directly 
influence policy outcomes. 
In addition to the slow building of citizen-based oversight institutions like 
the policy councils, the investment in anti-corruption institutions also helps 
to explain the PT's continued support within civil society. The PT's schizo-
phrenic actions in the presidency are nowhere better illustrated than in the 
fundamental contradictions between the government's efforts to strengthen 
anti-corruption institutions and the involvement of party officials in kickback 
schemes. During the Lula and Dilma administrations, three of the most note-
worthy institutional changes include the strengthening of the General Con-
troller of the Union (Controladoria Ceral da Unimo; &*8the passing of the 
Freedom of Information Act, and a new law to combat money laundering. 
President Cardoso created the &*8in to monitor the implementa-
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tion of public works projects, and the PT strengthened it, in part through a 
national conference on enhancing the CGU's ability to fight corruption, the 
passing of a Freedom of Information Law, and the random selection of mu-
nicipalities and states to be audited (Taylor this volume; Michener 2015). The 
institutional design of the CGU was a major advance over the design of the 
accounting tribunals, which are tied to the legislatures and form a legalistic 
body that focuses on close review of year-end reports rather than on curtailing 
and reining in existing corruption. The CGU, on the other hand, is actively 
involved in ensuring that municipal, state, and federal governments properly 
allocate federal resources. The CGU leads investigations on issues such as 
bidding, "ghost" employees and companies, and quality of implementation. 
At the municipal level, the CGU randomly selects fifty municipalities per year 
(out of 5,570) and conducts an extensive audit of each municipality's finances. 
Although the number is less than 1 percent of all municipalities, it creates the 
understanding that the federal government is more aggressively monitoring 
how municipalities spend resources. The CGU also receives complaints from 
citizens, which further allows it to identify wrongdoing (Teixeira et al. 2013). 
More broadly, the great unknown, of course, is whether the PT was in-
volved in corrupt activities to a greater extent than previous presidential ad-
ministrations or if the federal state was finally equipped with the resources 
to investigate and prosecute allegations of corruption (see Praoa and Taylor 
2014; Taylor this volume). While it is hard to know whether the PT was more 
corrupt than prior governing parties or whether the state was much better 
than before at effectively policing illegal arrangements, it seems fair to con-
clude that the improved institutionalization of the state's oversight capabili-
ties at least partially explains why the PT was ensnarled in multiple corruption 
scandals, and why these scandals gained more prominence than similarly 
corrupt activities under prior administrations. What is baffling about the PT 
administrations is the continued engagement of many party officials in pre-
cisely those activities that oversight institutions were being strengthened to 
investigate. 
President Dilma deepened the commitment to increased transparency by 
promoting the adoption of a sweeping Freedom of Information (FOI) Law as 
well as a critically important anti-money-laundering law. The former provides 
citizens the ability to gain access to basic data information using a formal 
request process that gives the government thirty days to respond. The FOI 
law had languished in Congress for years before President Dilma persuaded 
Congress to approve it (Michener 2015). The political push to approve the 
FOI was directly tied to Brazil's role as a founding member of the Open Gov-
ernment Partnership (OGP). Eight countries founded the OGP and the or-
ganization was initially led by the United States and Brazil. The first annual 
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conference was held in Brasilia in 2012 and was headlined by speeches by 
President Dilma and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The leadership 
of President Dilma, the PT, and Brazil in this organization captures the efforts 
of some PT officials to promote policy reform: government officials used the 
OGP summit to push through the FOI legislation, which gave the Brazil-
ian government more legitimacy within the OGP as well as internationally 
(Michener 2015). 
The money-laundering law was approved by Dilma two months after the 
FOI law, in July 2012. Most significantly, this law made it illegal to conceal 
assets even when prosecutors cannot directly establish a link between the as-
sets and criminal activity, made "dummy" companies and individuals equally 
liable as those directing the laundering process, and made plea bargaining an 
option for prosecutors to pursue. This combination has given the Lava Jato 
investigators the tools to follow the money trail in complex kickback schemes 
and get to the intellectual authors, including high-ranking business execu-
tives and party officials. Especially without plea bargaining (known as delaomo 
premiada in Brazil), it is unlikely that so many and such KLJKUDQNLQJaccom-
plices would have been investigated. 
Overall, the new or reinvigorated participatory institutions under the PT 
and its rhetorical and even legislative support for transparency and oversight 
combined with economic growth and improving social indicators to help con-
vince the PT's base to continue voting the party into the presidency, at least 
through 2014. Dilma herself encouraged the notion that she was personally 
committed to fighting corruption, especially after the mensalao scandal, and 
was much more active than Lula or Cardoso in removing corrupt ministers 
from her cabinet during her first term (Balin 2014, 83-84). 'Initially this seems 
to have buoyed her popularity, but then the Lava Jato investigation and the 
economic crisis destroyed it in 2015. And, with her FRQWUROover Congress 
in grave doubt, and impeachment proceedings looming, Dilma invited Lula 
into her cabinet in 2016, which was widely viewed as a rnove to help him 
avoid prosecution, thus shredding any credibility she had gained from her 
prior anti-corruption housecleaning. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, the PT moved far from its early roots as a party that sought to root 
out corruption and end the misuse of public resources. The PT has become 
quite schizophrenic, simultaneously engaged in some of the world's most 
innovative social, participatory, and transparency programs but also exploit-
ing traditional presidential prerogatives of naming vast numbers of allies to 
key jobs, which were then leveraged to allocate resources to the party and to 
officeholders. It appears that the political need to raise campaign resources 
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and create a stable voting majority in the national Congress had a greater 
influence over the behaviors of elite PT officials than the fear that the state 
would successfully prosecute these officials and than their interest in trans-
forming Brazil's basic political institutions. Ironically, it was the PT's efforts 
to strengthen transparency institutions that help to explain how and why its 
high-ranking officials were successfully prosecuted for illegal activities. What 
is perhaps most baffling about the PT's governing strategies is the discon-
nect between the party's effort to improve transparency, participation, and 
accountability and its ongoing use of corrupt practices over the course of four 
presidential terms. 
The PT obviously did not invent corruption in Brazil, but we must be 
mindful of the possibility that the absolute scale of the fraud was greater 
during PT administrations than other democratically elected governments 
because of the vast resources that were poured into the return of the develop-
mentalist state during the 2ooos and VQuite simply, the economic boom 
produced a volume of publicly available resources that had not seen since 
the late 196os and early 1970s, when the government was controlled by the 
military. The bitter reality for many of the PT's most loyal supporters is that 
the PT behaved, once in power, in a similar fashion to political parties such 
as the PMDB, the PSDB, and DEM (previously PFL), as well as to military 
governments. 
There are four interweaving strands that help illuminate the PT's schizo-
phrenic nature. These strands are conditioned by external factors as well as 
internal features of the PT. Key external factors include the high cost of Bra-
zilian elections and the basic governing challenges faced by the PT. Internal 
factors include the strategic decisions of the party's dominant faction (the 
Campo 0DMRULWiULR), and the establishment of new institutions that were de-
signed to appeal to activists who sought to create new channels for participa-
tion and transparency. 
These interweaving strands also help us to illuminate how the PT might 
continue to shape Brazilian politics. First, political campaigns, especially 
presidential campaigns, are expensive. The PT desperately needed campaign 
donations from large business entities and not only altered its political and 
policy positions so as to place the party closer to the political mainstream to at-
tract funding but also directed federal budgetary resources to maintain fund-
ing for the future (Boas, Hidalgo, and Richardson 2014). However, after the 
Supreme Court's 2015 finding that campaign donations by corporations are 
unconstitutional, political parties will need to find new ways to raise money, 
and public funding ofelectoral campaigns may become more important. The 
strengthening of transparency mechanisms may mean that parties will rely 
less on illegal contributions because there is a much greater risk that illegal 
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actions will be successfully prosecuted. Thus, one important change we ex-
pect to see is that prominent campaigns (for the presidency, state governors, 
and senators) will be subject to more scrutiny and oversight, which will di-
minish the use ofkickback schemes and increase reliance on public funding. 
Second, the original Campo Majoritario group that directed the PT's 
move toward the center has lost many of its top leaders to jail or party expul-
sion. Lula and the PT itself have lost so much popularity that it is improbable 
the party will retain past levels of electoral support. It will prove difficult for 
Campo Majoritario leaders to maintain their hold on the PT, which could 
provide an opening for those sectors of the party that are less connected to the 
scandals. If Campo Majoritario leaders lose their grip on power, the PT may 
attempt to return to its roots as an ethical, reform-oriented party. The obvious 
danger for the PT is that its descent into "politics as usual" will make it very 
difficult for the party to regain, in the public's eye, its original brand of "good 
governmen.W
Third, the PT's most significant governing challenge-its position as ami-
nority party-meant that it needed to use the extensive budgetary and policy 
prerogatives of the presidency to build stable voting majorities. The dark un-
derside of "coalitional presidentialism" is that presidents must find a variety 
of carrots to induce coalition partners to support their actions. Given the lim-
ited policy positions of most Brazilian parties, this has meant that presidents 
distribute personalistic benefits, including government jobs and campaign 
funds. It is likely that future presidents will contend with similar problems, 
but the exposure, in the Lava Jato investigation, of bribery networks reaching 
all the major political parties has renewed calls for a switch to a parliamentary 
system or, more minimally, at least to an internal reorganization of Congress. 
Finally, the expansion of oversight and transparency mechanisms under 
the PT helps explain why so many PT officials working in the executive 
branch were caught involved in wrongdoing. The PT governments strength-
ened the very state institutions that caught PT officials. Going forward, re-
searchers and activists will need to closely monitor the administrative and 
political support given to these institutions. If there is continued support for 
transparency, participation, and oversight institutions, we would expect that 
illegal use of public resources will diminish. If future governments weaken 
the new institutional arrangements, it is possible that there will be reen-
trenchment of "politics as usual." Given the PT's weakened party brand on 
the issue of clean government, there is now an absence of a credible political 
party that is willing to systematically lead this political effort. 
The PT is obviously badly wounded by its immersion into politics as usual. 
The open question is whether voters will punish only the PT for its descent 
into politics as usual or whether they will reject all major political parties. Re-
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gardless, it is unlikely that the PT will be able to reposition itself as a party that 
appeals both to voters with its modo petista de governar and to businesses and 
political allies with its acceptance of politics as usual. Lula appears to have 
been a singular figure in his success in incorporating both of these governing 
strategies. If Brazilian basic accountability institutions are strengthened, we 
would expect to see the "ethical" side of the PT gaining strength within the 
party, which would suggest that it would lead the party away from traditional, 
corrupt practices. But if the accountability institutions are weakened, we 
would expect that the PT will remain mired in "politics as usual" and unable 
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